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Being labelled and framed as a remote 
periphery of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq is transforming since 2003 into a cen-
ter attracting investments worth billions 
of dollars. Investigating this transforma-
tion, I scrutinize one of the visible out-
comes of the investments, namely shop-
ping malls, as examples and symbols of 
“modernity” and “progress.” The recently 
built shopping malls are thereby ana-
lyzed as the built materialization and sym-
bols of neoliberal transformation and 
socio-economic change. Engaging with 
representatives of shopping malls as well 
as with the experiences of young female 
shopping-mall-goers, it will be illustrated 
how modernity and progress is framed 
within the Kurdish nationalist narrative 
and how this is taken up by young Kurd-
ish female mall-goers. Thus, it will be con-
tended that a historical narrative of past 
sufferings comes to legitimize the new 
liberal “freedoms” that are available 
through the full connection to and par-
ticipation of Iraqi Kurdistan in the capital-
ist economic world system.
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Since the fall of the Iraqi Baʿth regime in 
2003, Iraqi Kurdistan has witnessed an 
economic boom. Obvious manifestations 
of this neoliberal transformation are 
apparent in the rapid changes of the 
urban landscapes of Kurdish cities like 
Dohuk, Sulaimaniya and especially Erbil, 
the capital of the Kurdish region: shop­
ping malls, gated communities, newly 
built luxury hotels, and “Western-style” 
bars and cafés have come to dominate 
the urban landscape. While metropolitan 
central spaces are thus emerging, this has 
to be understood in the historical context 
of Iraqi Kurdistan, which was until recently 
framed as a remote and peripheral region 
within Iraq (e.g. Natali; Stansfield). Stud­
ies that have specifically addressed 
peripheralization processes in Iraqi Kur­
distan are rare, but Andrea Fischer-Tahir 
and Arian Mahzouni have engaged with 
peripheralization on a local level. 
Mahzouni analyzes the effects and causes 
of the widening gap between the “urban 
core” and the “rural periphery” in Iraqi 
Kurdistan while Fischer-Tahir highlights 
the different ways that the district of 
Qaradagh has become dependent on 
Sulaimaniya and thus has been produced 
as the periphery of the latter. 
In this paper, I will focus on a global scale, 
outlining the transformation of Iraqi Kur-
distan from a remote periphery into a 
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center attracting US$39 billion of invest­
ment (RUDAW), mostly apparent in the 
construction sector and the production 
of spaces of affluence and exclusivity. 
Thus, I will specifically scrutinize shop­
ping malls as symbols and the built mate­
rialization of “modernity” and exclusivity 
that embody the merging of a neoliberal 
ideology of success with a Kurdish nation­
alist narrative. 
I will take on an ethnographic perspec­
tive1 on shopping malls in order to under­
stand the transformations taking place in 
people’s everyday life, and will specifically 
address the following questions: How do 
representatives of shopping malls in 
Kurdistan refer to shopping malls? How 
are these newly emerging places incorpo­
rated into people’s everyday life, and 
what meaning do malls acquire in the 
lives of especially female Iraqi Kurdish 
shopping-mall-goers? How are shopping 
malls “produced” in a Lefebvrian sense 
and what do they symbolize in the context 
of Iraqi Kurdistan?
Focusing on these questions, I undertook 
four months of intensive ethnographic 
field research, from March to June 2014, 
which was the basis for my master thesis, 
titled “Subjectivity and Space: Shopping 
Malls in Iraqi Kurdistan.” I conducted inter­
views with representatives of shopping 
malls—mainly representatives of Mazi Mall 
in Dohuk and Majidi Mall in Erbil—and I 
also interviewed Iraqi Kurdish female mall-
goers. For most of the intimate informa­
tion, I relied on my female family members 
in Dohuk. In addition, I engaged in par­
ticipant observations and informal conver­
sations with mall-goers and shopping mall 
representatives while also incorporating 
everyday life conversations into this study. 
Having adapted an ethnographic method­
ology in order to capture people’s every­
day life, it is philosopher Henri Lefebvre 
who emphasized the importance of the 
subject and the everyday life to under­
stand the production of space in its 
entirety.2 It is thus his theoretical insight 
that will underpin this analysis of the pro­
duction of malls in Iraqi Kurdistan.
A Lefebvrian Approach 
Engaging with the aforementioned ques­
tions during my research, I understand 
the production of shopping malls in Iraqi 
Kurdistan to be founded on the produc­
tion of peripheries. These peripheries 
might be geographically locatable in the 
rural areas of Kurdistan, or Nepal and 
Bangladesh, where most of the cheap 
labor in Iraqi Kurdistan comes from. 
Peripheries are also produced within cer­
tain parts of the city of Dohuk, Erbil and 
Sulaimaniya, or even in a disguised form 
in the shopping malls themselves, such as 
through the presence of foreign cheap 
labor in the mall, for example. As has 
been pointed out by Fischer-Tahir and 
Naumann, the construction of centers and 
peripheries results from the same process 
of an uneven capitalist investment policy 
that favors certain spaces over others: 
“Peripheralization refers to a spatially 
organized inequality of power relations 
and access to material and symbolic 
goods that constructs and perpetuates 
the precedence of the centers over areas 
that are marginalized” (14). 
Understanding peripheralization as part 
of the production of social injustice that is 
produced through economic, social and 
discursive transformations, the three-
dimensional theory of Lefebvre will serve 
as a fruitful concept to grasp and analyze 
the production of shopping malls. Lefeb­
vre’s idea of space is based on a triad of 
moments in which space is (re-) produced. 
While keeping in mind that it is an ana­
lytical division rather than a division mir­
rored by social reality, I will focus on the 
analysis of the production of lived and 
conceived space of malls. To conceive or 
think about space requires the produc­
tion of knowledge on a certain space and 
thus, the production of space itself. Con-
ceived space therefore is part of what 
Foucault defined as discourses and what 
Lefebvre calls the “dominant space in any 
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society (or mode of production)” (39) and 
more precisely:
Representations of space: conceptu­
alized space, the space of scientists, 
planners, urbanists, technocratic sub­
dividers and social engineers, as of a 
certain type of artist with a scientific 
bent—all of whom identify what is lived 
and what is perceived with what is con­
ceived. (38-39)
These representations of space, e.g. con-
ceived space, are tied to the relations of 
production (33) and the knowledge that 
is thereby reproduced. Drawing on 
Gramsci’s term of hegemony, Lefebvre 
clearly states the existing “connection 
between knowledge (savoir) and power” 
(10). Framing conceived space as the dom­
inant space of representation, Lefebvre 
implies that lived space might be a coun­
ter space, as it is the “subject,” the indi­
vidual, the ordinary “user” of space and 
his/her experiences that are at the heart of 
any analysis. Lived space then is 
… space as directly lived through its 
associated images and symbols, and 
hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and 
‘users’ …. This is the dominated—and 
hence passively experienced—space 
which the imagination seeks to change 
and appropriate. It overlays physical 
space, making symbolic use of its ob­
jects. (39) 
However, keeping in mind the three-
dimensionality of Lefebvre’s idea, one 
needs to be cautious not to overempha­
size an antagonistic relation of “dominant” 
and “dominated” space. The material pro­
duction of space, namely perceived space 
(38) is the third moment of the production 
of space that renders a possible antago­
nism obsolete. Addressing lived space, it 
is more fruitful to take a closer look at the 
way “users” render this space into a “lived” 
space through “making symbolic use of its 
objects” (39). So, it is the meaning-making 
processes of ordinary “users” that will be 
the focus of the analysis of lived space.
As much as Lefebvre notes every society’s 
distinct mode of production (31), he 
accordingly stresses the “historical period” 
(27) for the analysis of the production of 
space. Thereby, he highlights the impor­
tance of each society’s specificities and 
distinctness with regard to socio-eco­
nomic and historical characteristics. 
Accordingly, I will present the recent 
socio-economic history of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Socio-Economic Transformations in Iraqi 
Kurdistan
It is widely acknowledged in academia 
that the US-led intervention in 2003 
brought a series of neoliberal policies to 
Iraq that was implemented through the 
Coalition Provisional Authority led by Paul 
Bremer (Tripp; Dodge). These policies “… 
seemed to be opening up Iraq to a free-
for-all of economic opportunity, in which 
Iraqis themselves could only play a minor 
role” (Tripp 289-90).
Central developments before 1991 cannot 
be discussed at appropriate length here; 
however, the years of war, especially, the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the targeted 
aggressions of the central Iraqi govern­
ment that deprived Iraqi Kurds of their 
livelihood need to be noted as crucial 
developments that have had long-term 
effects for today’s politics (Yildiz 68). One 
of the most gruesome acts of violence 
committed by the former Iraqi regime was 
the Anfal campaign in 1988 that culmi­
nated in the chemical gas attacks on Hal­
abja (Mlodoch 64). Anfal is to the present 
day inscribed into the Kurdish narrative of 
past sufferings and thereby also instru­
mentalized by various Kurdish parties for 
different Kurdish nationalist purposes 
(Watts, “Role of Symbolic Capital” 73). 
In 1991, a no-fly zone was established that 
ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Iraqi 
army from Iraqi Kurdistan. Following this, 
a UN economic embargo was imple­
mented which paved the way for the start 
of a humanitarian aid regime, including 
international nongovernmental organisa­
tions (INGOs) that met the basic needs of 
the local population. In addition to the 
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general UN sanction regime against Iraq, 
Saddam Hussein imposed an internal 
embargo on the Northern Kurdish prov­
inces, which meant that in the “relief 
phase” financial resources were scarce 
and the control of these resources became 
ever more contested. One of the most 
lucrative businesses was the trade in pet­
rol products at the Ibrahim Khalil border 
crossing in Zakho. Leezenberg notes how 
“… the petrol trade was increasingly 
‘privatized’: in a sense it replaced the state 
supplies of oil to the north, at far greater 
cost to the local population” (“Iraqi Kurd­
istan” 638). Furthermore, these economic 
developments and lack of resources were 
also a crucial factor contributing to the 
next war, namely the civil war between the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the 
Kurdi stan Democratic Party (KDP) from 
1994 until 1998 (638). Among the reasons 
for the end of the militia war was the Oil-
for-Food programme (OFFP) imple­
mented in 1997. Thirteen percent of the 
revenues were set to be sent to the Kurd­
ish region. Although this marked an 
important point of change towards better 
living conditions, the sanctions regime 
was still ongoing and an aid regime con­
tinued that undermined a self-sufficient 
economy (639-40). The start of the OFFP 
thus marked a shift towards a broader 
reconstruction effort of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
However, this remained “within a neolib­
eral framework” where “entrepreneurial 
classes” emerged and a “more diversified 
workforce” (Natali 148) developed. 
Consequently, at the end of the OFFP 
came the gradual neoliberalization of Iraqi 
Kurdistan: for the Iraqi state and specifi­
cally for Iraqi Kurdistan, the political par­
ties were divorced from their responsibil­
ity to provide for society. The basic 
provision of society was rather done by an 
established humanitarian aid regime. On 
a political level the aid regime also con­
tributed to the emergence of a Kurdish 
region more and more separate from Iraq. 
Gradual support of the Kurdish region and 
the idea of a Kurdish nation through an 
international Western aid regime was an 
emerging trend at this point, and this 
development was further carried on 
through different business players and 
Western campaigns in 2003.
After 2003: “Kurdistan Is Open for Busi-
ness”3
With the US-led invasion of Iraq, Iraqi 
Kurdistan could declare its own autono­
mous status, thereby also enhancing its 
own “international legitimacy and internal 
sovereignty” (Natali xxvi). This was further 
institutionalized in the Iraqi constitution, 
lending greater recognition to the Kurdish 
region. In 2006, the PUK and KDP also 
decided to formally merge into the Kurd­
istan Regional Government (KRG). This 
alliance enabled them to “share the spoils 
of lucrative construction, business, and 
petrol-related contracts” (Watts, “Democ­
racy” 146). This arrangement was further 
institutionalized after 2003 when the KRG 
had enough international recognition to 
actively pursue a policy where attracting 
foreign direct investment became a top 
priority. Denise Natali frames this policy as 
a “developmental strategy [that] focuses 
on private sector growth” and is “under­
pinned by Kurdish nationalist priorities” 
(86). It is important to note from these 
developments that the changing eco­
nomic conditions not only led to the emer­
gence of a Kurdish quasi-state, but also 
transformed Kurdish nationalism, a devel­
opment that will be discussed further in 
this work. Feeding into the Western view 
of an undemocratic authoritarian Middle 
East, Kurdish nationalist elites redefined 
“democraticness” as a key feature of Kurd­
ish identity, as pointed out by Nicole 
Watts: “The ‘democratic-ness’ of Kurds has 
been one of many factors used to juxta­
pose Kurds and Kurdish identity against 
Arabs, in particular” (“Democracy” 148).
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“We Love Kurdistan and That Is Why … It Is 
Secure”: Transforming Kurdish Nationalism 
to Build Malls 
In late April, 2014, HEWA Group4 had a 
stand promoting new housing opportu­
nities to Majidi Mall visitors close to the 
entrance. As I approached the stand with 
a male German friend, we were greeted 
in English. After asking in Kurdish what 
this stand was about, the employee con­
tinued in English. After talking about 
what HEWA Group, the owners of Majidi 
Mall, were promoting, we expressed our 
astonishment at this fast development of 
construction:
Me: Wow, this is a really fast construc­
tion process.
HEWA Group representative: Yes. 
Kurdistan is developing very fast. Peo­
ple say it is becoming the new Dubai. 
And I would say we would be even bet­
ter than Dubai. I mean the people of 
Dubai are also very ambitious and they 
did a lot for their country and built a lot. 
But you know the weather over there is 
not that good…you cannot walk out­
side. But Kurdistan also has beautiful 
nature…so we have a lot and we are 
building all this. So we are proud of our 
development and Kurdistan is secure.
Friend: Why do you think that Kurdis­
tan is so secure?
HEWA Group representative: Well, 
because we love Kurdistan and that is 
why. The middle and south of Iraq is 
not so secure but here it is secure and 
that is the most important thing: secu­
rity. Let me give you this leaflet. It has 
some more information on it and you 
can also visit our website.5
This short encounter with a representative 
of HEWA Group captures and illustrates 
many of the complex levels of the ways in 
which malls and also housing opportuni­
ties are represented within the Kurdish 
discourse. As will be further shown, “devel­
opment” in this encounter is equated to 
impressive construction projects like 
malls, amusement parks and gated com­
munities. At the same time, as illustrated in 
the above conversation, this is merged 
with a local sentiment of Kurdish national­
ism: the newly built construction projects 
embody the Kurdish capability for “mod­
ern progress” not only to the Kurds but, 
maybe more importantly, to potential 
Western investors. One of the most appar­
ent aspects of this was the fact that the 
representative of HEWA Group led the 
whole conversation in very good English. 
Not only does this indicate the internation­
ality of the whole housing project, it also 
shows who the target group is: upper-
class clients who are educated enough to 
converse in English.6 While this specific 
role of the English language is also clear 
in other contexts, it is obvious that speak­
ing English in the mall is naturalized, 
thereby creating it as an international 
space where Western or non-Kurdish cos­
tumers will be comfortable directly speak­
ing English. During my observations, this 
atmosphere differed drastically from what 
I experienced in the bazaar, where Kurdish 
is the first language spoken and where 
people only rarely speak English.7
In this conversation, the HEWA Group 
representative linked economic boom 
and architectural development to Kurdish 
nationalism. According to him, “Kurdistan 
is so successful and is not subjected to the 
violence in the rest of Iraq because Kurds 
are good patriots who love their country.” 
What remains unsaid but implicit in his 
message is that the rest of Iraq is insecure 
because of Arabs’ lack of love for their 
country and their incapability of being 
modern people embracing success. 
This is an important aspect of the re- 
making and transforming of Kurdish 
nationalism that is linked to the invest­
ments of foreign companies in Iraq. In 
Lefebvrian terms, this neoliberal Kurdish 
nationalism is the broader discursive con­
text enabling the conceived production of 
the mall. The gradual transformation of a 
Kurdish nationalist discourse that has 
been indicated by Denise Natali and 
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Nicole Watts and brought forward earlier 
in this text is increasingly entangled with 
the concrete business interests of foreign 
elites. Aiming at investments from mostly 
Western European and American compa­
nies, the regional Kurdish elite is in need 
of presenting itself as the modern and 
secular force of the Middle East. The 
change in self-presentation of Kurdish 
leaders is thus fuelled by Western busi­
ness and entrepreneurial elites. The Other 
Iraq campaign8 is illustrative of convincing 
Western companies of the “modern Kurd­
ish working environment” that stands in 
contrast to the ways in which Iraq is por­
trayed as a country of chaos and violence 
in the media. The “othering” of Arabs 
might be found in classical Kurdish nation­
alist discourses before 2003, yet the ways 
in which this is now linked to Western 
business interests is an emerging ten­
dency. Magazines such as the Kurdistan 
Investment Guide, an official publication 
by the Kurdistan Regional Government in 
collaboration with Western scientists and 
business partners, is exemplary for pro­
motions that display the ways that busi­
ness interests are merged with Kurdish 
nationalist sentiments, one example 
being a Forbes & Manhattan advertise­
ment in the Kurdistan Investment Guide 
70 (2011), that portrays a child’s face 
painted over in a Kurdish flag and is sub­
titled: “PROUD TO INVEST IN THE FUTURE 
OF KURDISTAN.” 
As important as Western European and 
American companies and business part­
ners are, more immediate and regional 
models of success that Kurdish people 
relate to are countries such as the UAE and 
Turkey.9 This is illustrated by the following 
tour that I took in Mazi Mall in Dohuk with 
Niaz on April 16, 2014. Niaz, who intro­
duced herself as a representative for the 
mall, explained to me the important func­
tion of the mall in Kurdish:10
Me: So could you tell me something 
about the building of this mall?
Niaz: So this mall is very new and was 
just opened a few weeks ago. We also 
did not open everything. The owner is 
Haji Meshhud. He also built Dream City 
and the Mazi Supermarket in Dohuk. 
So this is all part of his project. In this 
mall we have only international brands. 
We opened this mall for them. Our 
contracts are only 4-5 years long and 
we do not have much to do with the 
shops. Only, with some of the shops, 
like for example Swiss Watch [while we 
are walking by that shop], we have con­
tracts in which they grant us 10 percent 
of their profits.
Before I met Niaz, I had heard the name 
Haji Meshhud from my family. They 
informed me that Haji Meshhud is well-
known in Dohuk. He was once, probably 
in the period of the 1990s, a rather poor 
street vendor, but made a quick career 
within the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
Asking how they knew this, they said that 
this is common knowledge in Dohuk. He 
is supposed to be among the KDP elite, 
with good contacts to the Turkish busi­
ness elite. Niaz did not talk much about 
what or who Haji Meshhud is but referred 
quite naturally to the fact that Haji 
Meshhud is “the owner” of Mazi Mall and 
“built Dream City and Mazi Supermarket” 
in Dohuk. That Haji Meshhud did not actu­
ally “build” the mall but rather planned 
and managed the construction process of 
these malls became quite clear. However, 
the workers who actually built these malls 
remain unmentioned and thus out of peo­
ple’s consciousness. 
Describing the mall as an international 
and modern space is framed through a 
security discourse: expensive interna­
tional products not only need the modern 
space of the mall but also specific security 
concepts. Thus, the security staff in the 
mall is legitimized as a way to safeguard 
expensive Western products, thereby con­
tributing to a safe and harmonious envi­
ronment, as Niaz explains:
Me: Isn’t Kurdistan safe enough? Why 
do you need security within the mall?
Niaz: Yes of course it is. But with these 
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international brands or stores sell­
ing gold [walking by a shop that sells 
gold], there needs to be a special se­
curity staff for the sake of safety. This is 
done by a Turkish company.
Irrespective of the “logic and correct­
ness” of her argumentation, a compari­
son with a different Kurdish shopping 
context, namely the bazaar, that has no 
private security even though expensive 
goods such as gold are sold, illuminates 
the ways in which the consumption of 
international goods is linked to a “mod­
ern” shopping experience. Suffice it to 
conclude here that the need for shop­
ping malls to sell international products 
contributes to the production of the 
shopping experience as a profoundly 
modern, Western and exceptional expe­
rience. This experience cannot be 
obtained in the narrow alleys of the 
bazaar, and the bazaar is incorporated 
rather differently into the neoliberal proj­
ect of modernizing Iraqi Kurdistan: 
namely as the authentic place of Kurdish 
culture.11 
It is not only the exclusive high quality 
products from expensive Western brands 
on offer that quite obviously contribute 
to the malls’ image as Western, modern 
places. It is also the explicit intentions 
and vision of the architects and mall 
planers to promote the mall as a space 
that is planned and designed according 
to foreign ideas:
Niaz: A Turkish architect designed the 
mall according to foreign standards. 
As you can see, on the ground floor we 
also have a space for exhibitions. So 
artists can also exhibit their products.
Emphasizing the presence of foreign 
designers and international brands in the 
mall, Niaz is also explicit about her idea of 
the mall as a positive step forward and ulti­
mately as the space of modernity: 
Me: Do you think that the mall could be 
a danger to the bazaar? That in the end, 
we will not have bazaars anymore?
Niaz: No, I don’t think so. We need 
more of these malls and modern new 
centers to move forward. In the past, I 
always had to go to Erbil for shopping. 
And now I am here. Dohuk has its own 
mall. We actually had a lot of people 
who asked us when the mall will be 
finally opened. I was personally asked 
so many times. People need this. If they 
want to take a break, they come here. 
At nights, this mall is full of people.
The way in which Niaz sees the mall as a 
new opportunity for people to enjoy, 
amuse themselves or take a break from 
their everyday lives is quite characteristic 
of the broader way that the mall manage­
ment conceives of the mall and presents it 
as a space of modernity and symbol of 
progress. This conception of the malls is 
an important part of producing the mall in 
its entirety in the context of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
It has become clear how notions of “pro-
gress,” “development” and “modernity” 
become enmeshed with Kurdish national­
ist identities on a conceptual level. Follow­
ing up on this, it is crucial to investigate 
how these notions are taken up and lived 
through performances and practices 
within the mall.
Inside the Mall
Delving into the lived production of the 
mall, in the following I will describe a 
scene of family members and myself 
inside Mazi Mall in Dohuk:
Once inside the mall, my friends decided 
to take a walk. This meant that we started 
from the entrance and went from shop to 
shop, walking into the shops that were 
appealing to my friends. Appealing 
could mean that the prices were thought 
to be acceptable or because they had 
“great clothes.”
Getting started was different from the 
bazaar. In practice, trips to the bazaar 
would be much more target-oriented. 
Nesrin and Perwin knew what they needed 
and they told their mother in advance. 
And at the bazaar, we would go directly to 
shops that we knew rather than starting a 
random walk-around. Also, in discussion 
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and talks, I was told that for the bazaar it is 
better to take someone who knows his/
her way around. And so, the purpose of 
the mall was rather to walk around. Choos­
ing the mall as a space “to go out,” the 
intention of enjoying oneself was further 
demonstrated by another factor: taking 
photos.
Nearly everywhere in the mall, we would 
take photos of ourselves, in front of shops 
or within the shops. This was not uncom­
mon among the other shopping mall visi­
tors. Taking photos in Kurdistan as well as 
in other places happened to mark a spe­
cial event. It meant to deem an action, 
thing or place worth enough to make a 
picture in order to hold on to that moment. 
Being dressed-up and/or on a trip to 
nature with family/friends, school or uni­
versity ceremonies, weddings, etc. were 
usually moments that were worth taking a 
picture. However, it did not occur in the 
everyday life while wearing pyjamas or 
when going to the bazaar. Taking photos 
at the mall made the shopping mall expe­
rience very exclusive. It produced the mall 
as a valuable, special place to be. It was 
an event that had to be remembered. On 
another level, taking photos of oneself 
within the mall was part of the perfor­
mance of a modern Self. In this sense, the 
production of the mall and people’s 
Selves as modern and upper-class is part 
of a reciprocal relationship. Similar to the 
way in which Kurdishness had been con-
ceived earlier as comprising “progressive­
ness” and economic success (symbolized 
through the ability to build imposing 
architecture), this is how a new Kurdish 
Self is actually lived in and through the 
mall, thereby producing the mall as a 
modern space. 
We entered a shoe shop at the mall where 
Nesrin saw a pair of shoes she very much 
liked. She tried them on and expressed her 
admiration and love for the shoes. Her 
friends gathered around her while she was 
wearing the shoes and looking at them 
from the mirror. Everyone, me included, 
expressed that the shoes did indeed fit 
her. However, no one suggested that she 
should buy the shoes. Instead, her cousin 
told her that she should not leave any of 
her wishes unfulfilled (lit. do not leave any-
thing inside your heart). “You try them and 
make a photo of yourself. You can look at 
it all the time.” The girls did not buy the 
clothes but rather tried them on to make 
photos of themselves. This was repeated 
several times. In another shop, Nesrin and 
Perwin made photos of themselves with 
differently colored hats on. 
This performance might indeed happen in 
other contexts and countries; however, 
the Kurdish historical context lends its 
specificity to the performances of young 
Kurdish female mall-goers. Having out­
lined the decades of war, sanctions and 
the discourse of the “historical Kurdish suf­
fering,” this context needs to be taken into 
consideration. In the Kurdish context, 
within my observations and conversations, 
the fact that especially an older genera­
tion could not fulfil so many of their 
dreams and had lived a life of scarcity was 
also ingrained into younger generations’ 
narratives of the past. The insistence of 
Nesrin’s friend to not leave her wishes 
unfulfilled must be understood in this his­
torical context. Thus, it is stated that today 
it is not necessary to suppress one’s wishes 
anymore, especially when being in a shop­
ping mall. Consequently, it is a history of 
suffering and abundance that is partly 
legitimizing a new type of freedom that 
enables Iraqi Kurdistan, exemplified 
through its shopping malls and mall-
goers, to present itself as part of the mod­
ern capitalist world system. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have outlined how shop­
ping malls in Iraqi Kurdistan are desig­
nated as symbols of “modernity” and the 
drastic socio-economic change of the 
region. Not only geographically a periph­
eral region of the Iraqi state but also eco­
nomically, socially and culturally produced 
as the periphery of Iraq, the Kurdistan 
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Region is developing into a center of 
investment to Iraq, if not the entire Middle 
East. Theoretically underpinned by Lefeb­
vre’s concept of conceived space, it has 
been shown how malls are conceived as 
symbols of Kurdish success. “Kurds love 
Kur distan,” as has been said by the HEWA 
Group representative, and thus Kurdistan 
is safe and deserves liberty and the joy of 
shopping malls. Consequently, they have 
“earned” their right to be part of the mod­
ern, capitalist world system much in con­
trast to the Arabs of Iraq. This neoliberal 
Kurdish nationalism then also feeds into 
the desires of young female mall-goers 
who produce the mall, in Lefebvrian terms, 
as a lived space when they present them­
selves as “modern” and as finally part of 
the Western world. 
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